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Orne (1959) reported that a tolerance of logical inconsistencies 
distinguished hypnotized subjects from simulators. He termed this 
phenomenon "trance logic". Other investigators did not fully con­
firm Orrie's finding. The purpose of this study was to re-examine 
the trance logic concept using a simple, objective, but illogical 
task and with the hypnotist/subject relationship minimized.
Three groups of ten subjects each (insusceptible, moderately 
susceptible, and highly susceptible) were selected on the basis 
of scores on the Stanford Hypnotic Susceptibility Scale, Form C 
and the Stanford Profile Scales of Hypnotic Susceptibility, Form 
I (Weitzenhoffer & Hilgard,.1962, 1963). Insusceptibles were given 
instructions to simulate hypnosis. The two susceptible groups were 
hypnotized. All three groups.were administered the following ex­
perimental procedure: a circle about 1 1/2" in diameter was drawn
on the palm of each subject's dominant hand. Those in the simula­
ting group were told to feign anesthesia within the circle while 
subjects in the susceptible groups were given the suggestion of 
anesthesia within the circumscribed area. A second experimenter, 
blind to the hypotheses and able to see only each subject's hand, 
administered the experimental task while E-l was absent from the 
room. Thirty trials, using a Von Frey hair as the stimulus tool, 
were randomly administered under the following three conditions 
(10 trials each): inside the circle, outside the circle, no touch.
Subjects were instructed that each trial would begin with a buzzer 
sound arid to report whether they were touched inside or outside the 
circle. Four seconds were allowed for each trial.
The results indicated no significant differences between groups 
when subjects were touched outside the circle or not at all. When 
touched inside the circle, the test did significantly distinguish 
moderately susceptibles from simulators but not highly susceptibles 
from either of the other two groups. However, trance logic was not 
the differentiating factor since such responses were found in all 
three groups with near equal frequency.
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1. Individual Responses to Stimulation




The phenomenon of hypnosis has, since its first scien­
tific advancement by Mesmer in 1778, been the subject of 
continued.study and argument, often couched in mystical 
terms, as often de-bunked as hocus-pocus, but never defined. 
Attempts have been made to understand physiological concom- 
mitants, largely unsuccessfully. No succinct explanation 
of the phenomenon itself has been advanced.; certain be­
haviors have been reliably demonstrated to be the products 
of hypnosis, but. no.essential phenomenon that could be said 
to.be hypnosis has been isolated, tested and proven.
Research initiated by Martin Orne (1959) and.recent 
theoretical contributions made by Ernest Hilgard (1977) and 
John and Helen Watkins (1979, 1979-1980) all point to a pos­
sible crack in the impasse. Described as an increase in 
executive boundary permeability (by the Watkins), and as a 
reduction in executive-monitor functioning (by Hilgard), the 
phenomenon can be summed up in two segments. First, there 
appears in the induction of hypnosis to be a contract between 
hypnotist and subject —  an interrelation —  that permits and 
defines the changes that are to occur. The second segment is
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the theoretical process by which hypnotized persons somehow 
reconcile illogical demands in the performance of a task 
without manifesting disturbance arising from the illogicality. 
In other words, with the assistance and guidance of the hyp­
notist, the subject somehow alters his normal, critical, self­
defensive functioning and performs tasks that are formally 
illogical without exhibiting distress over the illogicality 
—  without, it seems even recognizing the illogicality. This 
tolerance of logical inconsistencies has been termed "trance 
logic" by Orne.
Numerous attempts have been made to examine this pheno­
menon experimentally. However, two factors appear to have 
served to add confusion and limit reliability. The first is 
the interference of interrelational aspects of the induction 
with the subsequent task performance and the second is the 
complexity pf the task itself. The purpose of the present 
study is to investigate the types of alterations in psycho­
logical functioning effected by hypnosis when the hypnotist- 
subject relationship is minimized during task performance and 
a task is provided that is, while formally and obviously il­
logical, simple to score and evaluate.
CHAPTER II
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE
Physiological Explanations of Hypnosis 
In the mid-1700's the attention of the scientific 
community was drawn to the phenomena of hypnosis. The men 
who initially undertook the task of systematically exploring 
various hypnotic phenomena had been almost invariably 
trained in medicine. It is logical that in this early 
modern phase in the history of hypnosis, the explanations 
provided by these men were primarily physiological in nature.
For example, the conception which is typically seen as 
marking the beginning of modern hypnosis was that of "animal 
magnetism" presented by Mesmer. He believed that a subtle 
"magnetic fluid" was generated in his own body and trans­
mitted through elaborate passes of his hands to the patient. 
"Animal magnetism" referred to the force that brought about 
the hypnotic effects. This theory was discredited shortly 
after its presentation to his contemporaries when a Royal 
Commission set up by King Louis XVI to investigate Mesmer's 
practices and composed of prominent scientists of the day 
concluded that overwhelming stimulation of the patients' 
imaginations caused the reported effects. However, by this
3
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time the interest of other scientists had been aroused; the 
search for testable explanations of hypnotic phenomena had . 
begun.
After the conception of "animal magnetism" had been 
disproved, the man who did most to perpetuate a scientific 
interest in the study of hypnosis, and the one to whom the 
name hypnosis is due, was the Englishman James Braid. He 
recognized the apparent similarities between sleep and hyp­
nosis (1889), an analogy also used by Bernheim (1888) and 
Liebeault (188 9). The techniques of hypnotic induction have 
served to maintain use of this analogy to the present day. 
However, to the further credit of these early researchers, 
it must be added that they were also careful to distinguish 
between hypnotic sleep and normal sleep.
More recent physiological studies also attest to the 
difference between normal and hypnotic sleep. For example, 
Nygard (1939) found no differences in blood flow to the 
cerebral vessels when subjects were in the waking or hyp­
notic state, but when asleep their blood flow was signifi­
cantly altered. Jana (1965) also reported this same pattern 
with regard to basal metabolism. However, EEG studies (e.g., 
Dittborn and O'Connell, 1967) have found that the EEG of 
hypnotized subjects shows neither a state of physiological 
sleep nor a state of ordinary conscious awareness.
Another early investigator, Charcot (1882, 1887), 
viewed hypnosis as a pathological state,, believing that
5
both hysteria and hypnosis arose from a disordered nervous 
system; he emphasized a supposed neural substrate in both 
conditions. Since Charcot, no one has seriously suggested 
that hypnosis is a phenomenon dependent on innate lability 
or disease of the nervous system; both hypnotic and hys­
terical phenomena may occur in persons whose central ner­
vous systems are normal by any means of measurement cur­
rently available.
Pavlov (1957) presented a psychophysiological theory 
of hypnosis. He regarded hypnosis as a type of conditioned 
response, and envisioned that the monotony of a low-intensity 
stimulus, presented to a subject whose motor functioning was 
inhibited, would produce in the cerebral cortex a radiating 
area of neural inhibition. in his view, only the localiza­
tion of the inhibition differed from normal sleep which was 
pictured as general cortical inhibition.
Currently several lines of research are being pursued 
to determine physiological and neuroelectric underpinnings 
of hypnosis. To name a few, the relationship between hyp­
nosis and cardiovascular, gastrointestinal, endocrine, cu­
taneous and central nervous system functions have been and 
continue to be explored actively.
The interested.reader is directed to several excellent 
reviews of this literature, including Barber (1961), Crasil- 
neck and Hall (1959), Gorton (1949), Levitt and Brady (1963), 
Sarbin (1956), and West (1960). A more recent review (Sarbin
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and Slagle, 1972) indicates the mixed success such research 
has confronted. They report finding no evidence for a phy­
siological process that could serve as an independent cri­
terion of the hypnotic state. However, they did find strong 
evidence that symbolic stimuli and imaginings can produce 
impressive changes in physiological processes.
Possibilities and suggestions regarding the physiological 
underpinnings of hypnosis abound in.the literature, but the­
ories are notably absent. Obviously, such research suffers 
the problems of extreme complexity. Bowers' (1976) succinct 
statement, "anything gets more complicated the more closely 
you look at it" (p. 128), certainly applies to this field.
Psychological Theories
In addition to researchers who have attempted to pro­
vide physiological explanations of hypnosis, there are others 
who have offered an abundance of definitions from a psycholog­
ical perspective. The interested reader is referred to the 
following authors who have variously defined hypnosis as a 
state of hypersuggestibility (Bernheim, 1963; Braid, 1899; 
Liebeault, 1889); a form of sleep (Hull, 1933)-; a goal-directed 
striving (White, 1941); role-playing (Sarbin, 1950; Sarbin and 
Coe, 1972); a form of dissociation (Janet, 1907; Charcot, 1890; 
Hilgard, 1977); a state of decreased criticalness (Kline, 1958); 
a form of transference (Ferenczi, 1926; Watkins, 1954 , 196-3); 
a state-relationship (Watkins, 1967, 1978); a loss of ego 
boundaries (Kubie and Margolin, 1944); a state of contemplative
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meditation (Naruse, 1962); a regression in the service of the 
ego (Gill and Brenman, 1959) ; an atavistic regression 
(Meares, 1961); and a primative psychophysiological func­
tioning (Schneck, 1962). Most of the definitions- presented 
by these various authors either have not been expanded into a 
form which permits experimental validation or haVe not excited 
much impetus to do so. However, a few of these approaches to 
the understanding of hypnosis have excited much scientific 
attention. They will be discussed presently.
Although Bernheim (1888, reissued 1963), Braid (1899), 
and Liebeault (1889) based their explanation of hypnosis on 
underlying physiological changes, they were also the first, 
researchers in modern history to recognize the importance of 
psychological factors which contribute to this process. They 
have described hypnosis as a state of hypersuggestibility —  
a readiness to respond which the subject sets up within him­
self, and which the hypnotist aids via his suggestions.
Others, including Hull (1933) and Weitzenhoffer (1953), 
have continued in this tradition, viewing the relationship 
between hypnosis and suggestibility to b e .so intimate that 
they link the terms in the titles of their books. Unfor­
tunately, increased responsiveness to suggestion is more 
appropriately viewed as an observed effect of hypnosis than 
as a viable explanation of the phenomenon.
This link has persisted to the present day not only 
because increased suggestibility is viewed as a major
8
characteristic of hypnosis, but also because this readily 
observable feature has provided a convenient means to study 
hypnosis. Liebeault and Bernheim both proposed scales to . 
assess a .subject's degree of responsiveness to suggestion 
(Hilgard, et al., 1961). With the appearance of such scales 
it became meaningful to speak of the distribution of sus­
ceptibility according to the depth of hypnosis that a subject 
could reach. These early scales classified responsiveness 
to suggestion according to classes of events, e.g., cata­
lepsy and automatic obedience, rather than according to a 
subject's responses to specific tests, as seen in the widely 
used scales used today (e.g., Weitzenhoffer and Hilgard, 1959, 
1962, 1963; Shor and Orne, 1962).
White (1941) has proposed that the person in hypnosis 
plays a role, that is, he acts as he believes a hypnotized 
person should act. The social psychologists Sarbin and Coe 
have expanded on White's conceptualization. They view the 
subject's role as defined by the instructions and suggestions 
of the hypnotist, superimposed on the subject's general con­
ception of how a hypnotized person is supposed to behave 
(Sarbin, 1950; Sarbin and Coe, 1972).
The subject's success in taking the role of the hyp­
notized person depends on the following variables: (a) his
role expectations; (b) his role perception which varies de­
pending on his interpretation of the hypnotist's statements; 
(c) his role-relevant skills, e.g., his capacity for vivid
9
imagination; (d) his self-role congruence, i.e., whether his 
self-perceptions and role expectations mesh; and (e) his 
sensitivity to role demands. The differential ability to 
respond among subjects is seen as a function of these vari­
ables. •
Barber and his associates have approached the explana­
tion of hypnotic phenomena from another perspective. They 
have presented a neo-behaviorist viewpoint, going to great 
length to account for hypnotic behavior in terms of its an­
tecedent events (Barber, 1969; Barber, Spanos, and Chaves, 
1974). These researchers reject the constructs of hypnosis 
and hypnotic state or trance and instead emphasize the sub- . 
ject's attitude, expectation, and motivation in the produc­
tion of hypnotic behavior. In short, they believe that most 
of the achievements in hypnosis are within the range of normal 
human capabilities and claim that individuals can be taught 
to respond to the suggestions of hypnosis within the context 
of "training in human potentialities".
Other researchers and clinicians place greater emphasis 
on the hypnotized person's subjective experiences. Such 
theorists accept the notion of an altered state of conscious­
ness as a useful assumptive basis. They agree with Tart (196 9) 
who strongly encourages the acceptance of the essentially 
subjective nature of the hypnotic experience, presenting the 
logical argument.that if we accept the ability of -people*in 
the usual waking state to describe themselves as being in a
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normal- state of consciousness at any given moment, we should 
acknowledge their capacity to recognize when they experience 
a state of consciousness that is different, namely, an al­
tered state of consciousness.
Two prominent psychologists today, Ernest Hilgard (1977) 
and John Watkins (1979, 1979-1980), have sought to understand 
how such alterations in the state of consciousness might take 
place. They have presented theories which could account for 
the changes in subjective experience and behavioral observa­
tions noted when a person has been hypnotized. These men be­
gan developing their ideas in functionally different situa­
tions -- Watkins in the clinical setting and Hilgard in the 
experimental. Yet both have arrived at strikingly similar 
conceptions regarding the splitting of mind which, apparently 
occurs in hypnosis.
Hypnosis and Dissociation Theory
Pierre Janet (1907) is commonly credited with origina­
ting the term "dissociation". He hypothesized that systems 
of ideas can be separated from the major personality and exist 
as subordinate personalities, unconscious but capable of be­
coming represented in consciousness through hypnosis. Janet 
introduced the term "subconscious" to refer to a level of 
cognitive functioning out of awareness which could occasion­
ally be brought to consciousness. The "subconscious" was in
11
contradistinction to the "unconscious", which could not be 
made conscious.
Morton.Prince (1909) introduced the term "coconscious" 
to emphasize the splitting of a normal consciousness into 
separate parts. He did not require separate functioning of 
the two cognitive systems without awareness or interference 
as a criterion. He wrote: "Certainly in many cases there
is a halting flow of thought of the principal intelligence, 
indicating that the activity of the secondary intelligence 
tends to inhibit the untrammeled flow of the former" (1929, 
p. 411). Hilgard's (1977) and Watkins' (1978) formulations 
are in accord with Prince's, that the divisions of conscious­
ness which occur in hypnosis are not necessarily pathological 
and operate concurrently.
Hilgard.(1975, 1977) presented the diagram in Figure 1 
to explain how the dissociation conception of hypnosis dif­
fered from Freud's (see Breuer and Freud, 1957). Freud's 
conception implied a horizontal division. Hypnosis as des­
cribed in terms of depth is one result of this way of think­
ing. However, Hilgard's opinion was that a vertical division 
was more appropriate. One reason for this was that the dis­
sociated parts of the self frequently did not show superior­
ity or inferiority in relation to each other. Rather, they 
may have been equally intelligent, well-adapted and not par­
ticularly regressive.
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Figure 1. Hilgard's Representation of Dissociation and 














This figure represents a distinction between the divisions 
of consciousness in dissociation and in psychoanalytic theory 
(simplified for this purpose). In psychoanalytic theory the 
available memories lie in the conscious (Cs) and the pre- 
conscious (Pcs), whereas the hidden ones are concealed under 
a repression barrier and lie in the unconscious (Uncs). The 
unavailable ideas are largely those bound up with affect-and 
impulse, and they enter consciousness only indirectly. In a 
dissociation through amnesia the split is among the usually 
available memories, arid the unavailable memories need have 
no special affective or impulsive significance (Hilgard,
1977, p. 81).
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Watkins' (1978) conception of ego states (Figure 2) as 
well as his representation of Federn's (195.2) ideas have been 
represented in circular fashion. This formulation allows for 
many different states rather than just two.
A Neodissociation Interpretation of Hypnosis.
Hilgard (1977, 1978) has offered his neodissociation 
interpretation as a needed integration of older dissociation 
theories with recent research evidence from the areas of 
information processing, divided attention and brain function. 
In a series of experiments, Ernest and Josephine Hilgard 
(1975., 1977) demonstrated that information of which a hyp­
notized . subject was not cognizant, such as sounds and pain, 
was being registered at some different level of personality 
organization. During a demonstration of hypnotic deafness, 
an observing student suggested that perhaps a part of the 
subject might have been able to hear what had been happening. 
To test this possibility, Hilgard suggested that, although 
the subject was hypnotically deaf, perhaps some part of him 
might have been hearing and processing what had occurred. .
If.this was the case, the subject was instructed to lift the 
index finger of his right hand. To the surprise of the ex­
perimenter, and the subject himself, the finger lifted.
Hilgard then established communication with an inner 
part of the subject through an automatic talking technique.
He labelled this inner part,"the hidden observer". "The
14
Figure 2. Watkins' Representation of the Structure 
of Personality as Conceived in Federn's 
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hidden observer" proved, through questioning, to be aware of 
all.that had occurred. Hilgard has investigated the func­
tioning of "the hidden observer" in analgesia studies as 
well. H6 has described it as a "cognitive control system" 
or "cognitive structural system".
Hilgard's (1977) investigation of the functioning of 
"the hidden observer" in hypnotic analgesia studies has re­
vealed covert experiences similar to those in his hypnotic 
deafness studies. Cold-pressor pain has been explored by 
suggesting to subjects that they will feel nothing, when their 
hand.is placed in circulating ice water. Most people are un­
able to tolerate more than 30 seconds of such immersion, 
however, Hilgard's subjects were tested for 45 second inter­
vals.
Subjects were instructed to rate their experience of 
pain on a scale from 0 for no pain to 1-10 for pain of in­
creasing intensity with 10 representing a pain so severe 
that the subject would prefer to remove the hand from the 
ice water. The overt, conscious experience of pain was re­
ported verbally, and the.covert, "hidden observer" exper­
ience was reported by automatic writing, in some experiments, 
anfl finger communications in others.
Very few of the highly hypnotizable subjects utilized 
in Hilgard's work reported a complete reduction in overt 
pain experienced. However, on the average subjects were 
able to reduce their pain to one-third of normally felt
16
levels, although "hidden observers" revealed approximately 
normal levels of pain being experienced at the.covert, dis­
sociated level.
Based on years of research with subjects in both hyp­
notic and non-hypnotic conditions, Hilgard (1977) has found 
it useful to discuss executive control and monitoring systems 
that permit information processing and behavior management to 
proceed without conscious representation. He begins by pos­
tulating a central regulating mechanism characterized by both 
temporary and enduring aspects which is limited in what it 
does and can do. This central regulatory mechanism is re­
sponsible for the facilitations and inhibitions that are re­
quired to actuate any of many possible subsystems of habits, 
attitudes, interests, specialized abilities, etc., at any one 
time. He implies a hierarchy of subsystems, although a shif­
ting one under the management of the control mechanisms.
Once a subsystem has been activated it continues with a mea­
sure of autonomy; the conscious representation of the control 
system may recede, leading to some degree of automatization. 
Such automatization of habit allows such dual actions as 
carrying on a conversation while engaged in habitual activity. 
The central control structure, or executive ego, encompasses 
the planning, monitoring, and managing functions required for. 
using the subsystems appropriately. The executive ego has no 
absolute authority, a constraint that becomes particularly 
clear when hypnotic influences are imposed.
17
Central executive functions are responsible for plan­
ning in relation to goals initiating action commensurate 
with these plans, and sustaining action against obstacles 
and distractions. The monitoring function includes alert­
ness to all that is taking place, a recognition of the fami­
liar, and a readiness for the unexpected. In addition to
f *
this general scanning, the monitor is selective in what is 
attended to, and includes a critical dr judgmental role, 
based on feedback from initiated and sustained action as 
what is done is compared with intended goals and perfor­
mances .
As Hilgard emphasizes, it.is artificial to separate 
executive and monitoring functions sharply because all. ini­
tiated action is monitored. He further postulates that the 
relationship between these two functions may either be har­
monious, as in trial-and-error learning, or unbalanced, as 
is demonstrated particularly well in hypnosis.
He defines subsystems as the identifiable activities 
in which a person can engage, to distinguish them from the 
larger control and monitoring functions according to which 
they are regulated. Furthermore, once a subsystem becomes 
engaged, its activity becomes relatively self-sustaining 
because subsystems are presumed to have their own individual 
monitoring and control systems which operate through habit 
and are mediated by feedback.
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Within the hypnotist-subject contract, Hilgard submits 
that the subject retains a portion of the executive func­
tions from his normal state while relinquishing some portion 
to the hypnotist. The person can answer questions about his 
part and his plans to participate in specific kinds of acti­
vities, but he will also do and experience what the hypnotist 
suggests, and lose control of his movements if this is indi­
cated. The net result is that the usual initiative of the 
executive is lost; its planning is inhibited, and it does not 
undertake new lines of thought or action. Furthermore, once 
the'executive has accepted the hypnotic contract, the moni­
toring function of the executive ego reduces the amount, of 
critical scanning and thereby relinquishes the usual reality 
orientation. The monitor may then report what occurs, e.g., 
"The arm is now stiff," without questioning the cause of its 
stiffness.
Particularly relevant to this thesis is the suggestion 
that the distortion of reality in hypnosis depends on the de­
gree of hypnotic involvement. As hypnosis increases, the ex­
ecutive relinquishes more of its planning function to the hyp­
notist and, in effect, orders the monitoring system to reduce 
its evaluative function, thereby yielding the distortion so 
characteristic of hypnotized subjects —  the monitoring sy­
stem uncritically accepts distorted reality and reports it 
"as-is" to the executive. The lack of normal criticism was 
termed "trance logic" by Orne (1959).
19
Parallel Versus Intermittent Processing
Multiple processing, and Watkins' ego state theory both 
presume parallel processing; each would be obivated if the 
mind intermittently processed information on differing levels. 
Accordingly, a brief presentation of psychological and,phy­
siological evidence for parallel-versus intermittent-processing 
of information is relevant. It will help to lend credulity to 
the conceptions of ego states and hidden observers, both of 
which imply two or more systems or part-personalities opera­
ting simultaneously.
After weighing the data derived from research at his 
Standord Unviersity laboratory, as well as from current brain 
research; Hilgard (1977) deduced that the evidence seems to 
support parallel as opposed to intermittent processing. His. 
major reason for reaching this conclusion was that parallel 
processing seemed more parsimonious since it accounted for 
the same phenomena while postulating fewer assumptions.
Prince (1929) reached the same conclusion for the same rea­
son several years ago with regard to his "coconscious".
Findings of Hilgard's hypnosis research which he felt 
supported parallel-processing included: (1) If information
concerning pain perception or hearing is requested and ob­
tained following hypnosis when only the memory can be tapped 
then the information must have been stored during the anal­
gesia or deafness. The fact that the maximum pain remem­
bered agreed with that reported overtly during the stimulation
20
makes it probable that continuous information-processing was 
also tapped by the inquiries during stimulation. (2) Pat­
terned series of stimuli which could not have been recovered 
by intermittent probing are recovered by the hidden observer 
method. For example, moderately painful electrical stimula­
tion through electrodes at different positions on the fore­
arm, presented in different orders and at different intensi­
ties/ can be accurately reported afterwards, even though the 
subject felt nothing at all while they were being processed. 
This is a convincing demonstration of a kind of information 
processing requiring considerable attention during its stor­
age, hence, of a "concealed cognitive system" operating in 
parallel during the. overt anesthesia. (3) Hidden experiences 
have been reviewed after all anesthesia has been eliminated 
and have thus never been those of "sampled" or "intermittent" 
experiences, but rather of a sense of continuity. On the 
other.hand, overt reports tend to have a degree of intermit- 
tence about them. The apparent continuity of the covert 
experiences supports parallel processing.
Parallel processing is not unknown in other areas of 
psychology, such as dichotic listening and subliminal per-' 
ception, and is also consistent with the facts of known neuro­
physiology:
The organization of the brain implies 
parallel processing; there are may 
different routes for information to 
pass from input to output structures 
in the brain (Thompson, 1976, p. 224).
Evidence for parallel processing, particularly through many 
different routes also lends support to Watkins' conception 
of ego states.
Watkins' Ego State Theory 
For several years John G. and Helen H. Watkins have 
been developing ego state theory and therapy (e.g., Watkins, 
H.' H. and Watkins, J. G. , 1976; Watkins, J. G. , 1977, 1978b; 
Watkins, J. G. and Watkins, H. H. , 1974 , 1978, 1979-^1980). 
This approach has been founded on their extensive and on­
going clinical experience, as well as upon the psycho- 
analytically-oriented theories of Sigmund Freud (1923) and 
Paul Federn (1952).
Ego state theory conceptualizes human personality as 
a multiplicity,, i.e., as "divided into organized patterns 
of behavior and experience which are partially dissociated 
from each other for purposes of adaptation and defense.
These subsystems are called 'ego-states'" (Note 1).
The Watkins' have defined an ego state as "a body of 
behaviors and experiences bound together by a common factor 
and separated from other such states by a boundary which is 
more or less permeable" (1977, p. 1). Ego states may be 
structured around various organizational patterns, for ex­
ample, age, a traumatic event, or relationships with parents 
or with friends.
Ego states are seen as originating within the indivi­
dual to serve some purpose for the person; a particular state
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may be responsible for expressing anger, playing rough-and- 
tumble games, concentrated study, being sensitive to subtle 
interpersonal cues, of any of a multitude of other thoughts, 
feelings, and actions possible in the human experience. One 
cannot predict the contents or number of ego states or "part 
persons" any one individual may have; no two people are 
alike. Furthermore, the Watkins (1977) consider the disso­
ciation of personality into ego states to occur as part of 
the normal developmental process or as a defensive reaction 
to trauma.
The dissociation which separates the existence and 
functioning of ego states from each other is viewed "not 
as an 'either-or', but like most other psychological pro­
cesses, it is continuous" (Note 1). The amount of contact 
between states may range on a continuum from extremely 
permeable to impermeable. Permeability suggests some degree 
of content sharing among the "part-persons" whereas awareness 
is not mutually available when the boundaries are impermeable. 
Boundaries between ego states exhibit varying degrees of. 
permeability both between people as well as within a single 
individual. Ego states representing the more, permeable end 
of the dissociative continuum are manifested by normal mood 
changes and at the less permeable by overt, multiple per­
sonalities. In between these extremes.ego states are seen 
to act like "covert" multiple personalities which influence 
the individual with relative degrees of autonomy, depending
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on the amount of energy they contain and the relative perme­
ability of their boundaries.
For example, two ego states may.share a memory for an 
event but, based on their own individual histories, they may 
hold differing cognitions, affects and motivations regarding 
the experience and, thus, perceive the event quite differently. 
If the perceptions are incompatible, the person will exper­
ience some degree of distress and internal conflict. The 
Watkins have found that an effective way to reduce such con­
flict is to increase the communication between the involved 
states and effect some sort of mutually agreeable compromise. 
They have found that to most effecitvely accomplish this end, 
each party in the conflict must first be permitted to express 
its perceptions and purpose (Watkins, H. H. and Watkins, J. G., 
1979; Watkins, J. G., 1977; Watkins, J. G. and,Watkins, H. H., 
1979). Thus, therapy facilitates greater awareness between 
states, i.e., it increases the permeability of the boundaries 
separating them. Cases of multiple personaity most dramati­
cally exemplify the existence of internal boundaries and the 
consequences of the absence of mutual awareness. To use an 
analogy, the right hand does not know what the left hand is 
doing and, therefore, has no influence or control over it; 
no compromise is possible unless awareness is first obtained.
At any given .time,one ego state is executive, or in 
control of the self. More than this, it _is the self in the 
present situation, and includes those behaviors and
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experiences currently available for expression. For example, 
a person may seem very different when he is partying on Satur­
day night in comparison with his Monday morning self at the 
office. It is as though he possesses two selves. This is 
because two different ego states are executive at each of 
these two times. Thus, one can observe changes in the pat­
terns of behavior which result quite naturally in response to 
situational variables just as a therapist can activate them 
for,the purpose of conflict resolution in therapy.
The Watkins have found that activation of specific ego 
states can be done either with or without hypnosis. According 
to Watkins, the hypnotized individual "does not lose his ego 
or all his defensive control. He just becomes less rigidly 
bound by them" (1978, p. 228). Stated in another way, the 
process of hypnosis can be seen as increasing the permeabil­
ity of the boundary of the executive ego state (the one being 
hypnotized); it relinquishes its controlling function over 
the personality, permitting easier access to the covert 
"part-persons". This phenomenon bears a striking and acknow­
ledged resemblance to Hilgard's (1977) multiple processing 
centers (Watkins, J. G. and Watkins, H. H., 1979-1980).
Watkins (1978) has defined hypnosis from the viewpoint 
of a clinician, preferring to call it a "state-relationship". 
Not only does he believe that a hypnotized person manifests 
an altered state of consciousness, as evidenced by increased 
malleability to suggestion resulting from the individual's
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less rigid defensive controls, but also that such a state is 
induced by an intensive interpersonal relationship. When 
using hypnosis in psychotherapy, "both factors are operative 
to some degree and cannot be separated from one another, as 
is often attempted in the experimental laboratory" (Watkins, 
1978, p. 227). This definition seems to reflect a similar 
sentiment expressed by Hilgard (1977), although he' derived 
his observations from the laboratory. He stated that a re­
quisite for successful hypnotic induction is the hypnotist- 
subject contract and based his neodissociation interpretation 
of hypnosis on the assumption that such a contract is estab­
lished.
An additional similarity between ego state and neo­
dissociation conceptions provides the crux of this thesis. 
Hilgard (1977) has found it useful to hypothesize a central 
regulating mechanism comprised of two interacting parts —  
the executive control and monitoring systems —  which permits 
information processing and behavior management to proceed 
without conscious representation. In hypnosis, the typical 
functioning of these components is altered. He proposes that • 
this alteration is ’primed’.to occur as a function of the 
hypnotic contract, resulting in a command being given by 
the executive to the monitor instructing it to reduce its 
evaluative functioning. The behavioral result is willingness 
to uncritically accept suggested distortions of reality— a 
willingness which is readily observable..
Although ego state theory is not a theory of hypnosis, 
Watkins (1978) has commented on the effect of hypnosis in 
facilitating the therapeutic manipulation of ego states. He 
has observed that a hypnotized person sheds some degree of 
his defensive controls, resulting in. a strong tendency to 
make conscious or potentially conscious those ego states 
normally operating below the level of awareness. Within the 
ego state framework. Watkins suggests that hypnosis involves 
a process which effects the permeability of the boundary of 
the executive ego state; it becomes more permeable, and as 
it does it relinquishes some of its controlling function over 
the personality.
In summary, two attributes of hypnosis form the basis 
for the present study: the critical role of the experimenter-
subject relationship in the induction of hypnosis and the 
change in executive functioning that is a consequence of 
that relationship. Whether seen as increased boundary per­
meability, lowered monitor criticality, or trance logic, the 
phenomenon is thought to be a correlate of hypnotic suscep­
tibility. The present study will attempt to isolate the 
effects of the phenomenon from the interrelational aspects 
of the induction and to correlate hypnotic susceptibility 
with a measure of "illogical" functioning thought to be a 
product of the phenomenon.
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Trance Logic.
Unlike Hilgard's and the Watkins' conceptions of 
hypnosis, Orne's concept of trance logic does not presume 
parallel information processing. It is based on a state 
theory of hypnosis, i.e., that the induction of hypnosis 
brings about a change in the state of consciousness, re­
sulting in increased suggestibility and a lack of logical, 
critical functioning.
-In 1959, Orne reported on a series of experiments 
conducted in his laboratory which were designed to isolate 
the "essence" of hypnosis. He recognized the need to develop 
some objective indices of hypnosis which would take the deter­
mination of. trance beyond the realm of subjective impression. 
To accomplish this goal he developed a working model of 
hypnosis. The model incorporated the assumptions that role- 
play and increased motivation accounted for much of the var­
iance in the production of hypnotic phenomena. To control 
for these artifacts, he developed a simulator-control/exper- 
imental groups design, reasoning that differences between 
the real and faking subjects that cannot be accounted for 
by the faking situation may be confidently viewed as char­
acteristics of hypnosis.
He reported that the most reliable criterion differ­
entiating "real" from "fake" subjects was the ability of a 
truly hypnotized subject to freely mix his perceptions 
derived from reality with those that stem from his
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imagination. This characteristic of tolerance of logical' 
inconsistencies he termed "tfance logic".
A situation he described which has since been viewed 
as the standard test of the phenomenon, and called the double 
hallucination test, is as follows. A co-experimenter (E-2) 
is in the testing room in full view of the experimenter (E-l) 
and the subject. The subject is hypnotized, and when his 
eyes are closed E-2 very quietly walks behind the subject 
and out of the subject's visual field. The subject is sub­
sequently instructed to open his eyes while still in a deep 
trance and a hallucination of E-2 sitting in the chair is in­
duced. After the hallucination appears to be fully accepted 
by the subject, and he appears to be responding to the hallu­
cination as though it were actually the associate, he is then 
instructed to turn around and look at E-2 with the question, 
"Who is that behind you?" Orne (1959) reported that "of ap­
proximately thirty 'faking' subjects" (p. 296) only two 
acted as if they saw two images of the same individual; the 
remaining twenty-eight subjects did not acknowledge E-2's 
presence. -On the other hand, "real" subjects all indicated 
verbally that they were perceiving two images of the same 
person and did not become seriously disturbed by this incon­
sistency. Further, the."reals" described their hallucina­
tions as having transparent qualities. For example, one 
subject said, "This is very peculiar, I can see Joe sitting 
in the chair and I can see the chair through him." Orne
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maintained that this type of reaction, when made spontaneously, 
was absolutely diagnostic of. the "real" subject. Although 
Orne failed to report the frequency of the reaction, it did 
not occur spontaneously with every tranceable subject; it 
was found, however, that "fake" subjects never gave such a 
response.
In attempts to replicate Orne's (1959) findings, other 
researchers have1met with less dramatic success. Johnson, 
Maher, and Barber (1972) reported that they did not find 
trance logic to be a discriminating characteristic of hyp­
notic subjects. They assigned 70 subjects to one of three 
treatment conditions —  hypnotic induction, instructions to 
simulate hypnosis, or imagination control. Simulating and 
imagination control subjects were found to demonstrate trance 
logic as often as highly selected tranceable subjects on 
Orne's two indexes of trance logic (the transparent hallu­
cination and the double hallucination). However, this study 
was soundly criticized by Hilgard (1972) on the basis of 
errors in data analysis, inappropriate design and methods of 
selection and training of subjects.
In a straightforward replication of Orne's (1959) work, 
McDonald and Smith (1975) reported no significant differences 
between carefully screened simulators and tranceable subjects 
on either the transparency or double hallucination measures. 
Even though their investigation failed to produce unequivocal 
evidence of the operation of trance logic, however, they
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reported that there were indications favorable to the issue. 
Specifically, they obtained three reports of transparency 
with very permissive, minimal cue-producing questioning and 
all three, of these reports were produced only by tranceable 
subjects.
Blum and Graef (1971) reported no greater success when 
using a slight adaptation of the double hallucination test. 
Unfortunately, they used only six subjects, four highly sus­
ceptible subjects and two simulators. The response charac­
terized as typical of true subjects was given only by one 
"real" but also by one simulator. One true subject was un­
able even to hallucinate the experimenter, and the two re-. 
maining tranceable subjects gave reports described by Orne 
(1959) as infrequent for that group (the hallucination dis­
appeared after the subject turned around and viewed the ac­
tual experimenter), a response which was duplicated by the 
second simulator.
In an unpublished doctoral dissertations, Peters (1973) 
found evidence more supportive of the hypothesis that trance 
logic characterizes one aspect of the "essence" of hypnosis. 
Unusual in this study is the inclusion in the design of a 
number of trance logic relevant tasks —  hallucination ;of a 
portrait, negative hallucination, age regression, source 
amnesia, and double and transparent hallucination. Scores 
for each task were obtained. Although response trends in­
dicated that more real hypnotic subjects than simulating
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subjects displayed trance logic behaviors, only three group 
differences approached significance (negative hallucination, 
source amnesia, and double hallucination) while only one — - 
transparent hallucination—  was statistically significant. 
Further, an overall trance logic score was obtained by simply' 
summing individually scored subject responses. This summary 
score yielded a highly significant group difference (p<.003) 
in favor of hypnotic subjects.
These studies share two methodological flaws -- explicit 
cuing of the subject's response and lack of assessment of 
gradations in hypnotic aptitude. To elaborate,, in each in­
vestigation the appropriate double hallucination response 
has been cued or suggested by the procedures the investiga­
tors have used; yet contemporary theorizing about the process 
is heavily reliant on the assumption that paradoxical re­
sponse in hypnosis is not dependent for its occurrence either 
on cues supplied by the hypnotist or existing in the stimu­
lus setting.
An analysis of these studies shows that the procedures 
have conveyed the desired response to subjects in a relatively 
clear and structured fashion. When double hallucination was 
tested, subjects typically hallucinated a person in the room 
at the hypnotist's request and,were routinely asked to turn 
around and confront the same person seated behind- them. 
Following Orne's (1959) lead, Johnson> et.al. (1971) asked, 
"Tell me, who is that behind you?" Peters (1973) pointed to
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the person behind and asked subjects directly who it was, 
and McDonald and Smith (1975) asked their subjects, "Can 
you see him in the chair?" In every one of these instances, 
the hypnotist highlighted his expectation that the person 
behind should be acknowledged, and so enhanced the proba­
bility of a trance logic response being observed.
Another, more subtle cuing aspect of these studies, is 
that measurement outcomes are crucially dependent on the 
interpersonal situation. The hypnotist is involved in a 
very delicate interpersonal interaction with the subject, 
especially with regard to confronting him with the dual per­
ception in the double hallucination test. As McDonald and 
Smith (1975) commented, to simply observe the looking-back- 
and-forth response that is said to occur among deeply hyp- 
notizable subjects "was quite difficult because some subjects 
indeed returned their point of vision to the chair, but they 
seemed to wait for a response from the hypnotist." They 
reported that others, looked at the hypnotist seemingly ex­
pecting an explanation.
Whatever the hypnotist does or says appears to have a 
differential cue value for the subject; at the same time, it 
is difficult to standardize experimentally the researcher's 
questions for this test while still making the interaction 
flow smoothly and without artificiality. Yet, as Orne (1959) 
cautioned, before an effect can be attributed legitimately
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to hypnosis, it is necessary to demonstrate that the effect 
is not primarily a function of demand characteristics.
The second issue raised by these investigations per­
tains to the model.used to test for the presence of trance 
logic in hypnotized subjects. Each of the above mentioned 
studies compares the performance of highly selected, deeply 
hypnotizable subjects with the behavior of simulators —  
subjects resistant to hypnosis and instructed to fool the 
hypnotist. In addition to the rationale given by Orne (1959) 
for this model, i.e., to control for role-play and increased 
motivation factors, the difficulty of the task itself appears 
to have limited the number of group comparisons possible; 
that is, positive visual hallucinations are achieved by re­
latively few, primarily virtuosos (Hilgard, 1965). Thus, 
moderately hypnotizable subjects have been excluded from these 
experiments because of item difficulty. However, current 
theorizing would predict that aptitude for trance is impor­
tant; thus, some degree of trance logic should be observed in 
subjects who are not capable of producing such extremely dif­
ficult hypnotic phenomena.
An interesting two-part study which attempted to address 
these issues was reported by Sheehan (1977). He reasoned 
that if tolerance of incongruity characterizes the behavior 
of hypnotized subjects, then it should not be dependent on 
either explicit or implicit suggestion for its occurrence. 
Further, trance logic should characterize the behavior of
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hypnotized subjects exclusively and be manifested to a degree 
corresponding to a subject's aptitude for trance.
In the first phase of the study, he used the real/ 
simulator design with 58 susceptible and 49 insusceptible 
subjects. The aim of this phase was to establish the con­
ditions for an optimal test of the phenomenon (by estab­
lishing minimal cuing), and to explore the claim that tol­
erance of incongruity is a defining property of hypnosis.
Subjects in the high-cue condition were given the 
typical instructions described above, whereas subjects in 
the low-cue condition were asked simply to "look around the 
room". Describe whatever you see, anything at all, whatever 
you see" (p. 196). He reported that the double hallucination 
measure did not differentiate subjects when there were no 
especially strong cues for appropriate response; the two 
groups of subjects (real and simulating) behaved comparably. 
However, an appreciable effect for cue structure was. found; 
in the high-cue condition none of the hypnotized subjects 
ignored the existence of the real object previously hallu­
cinated, and only 9% of the simulators did so. However, 
in the low-cue condition, 50% of the hypnotized a.nd 65% of 
the simulators ignored its presence.
Furthermore, the author analyzed the incidence of a 
transparency response using liberal criteria. A trans­
parency report was counted if the subject either spontan­
eously reported images of their original hallucination
35
indicating a lack of solidity or a transparent quality, or 
if such a description was obtained during a post-experimental 
inquiry. He reported a significant group difference on this 
measure in favor of hypnotized subjects (p<-001).
The second phase of this study was concerned with how 
much the aptitude for trance per se is related to the trance 
logic phenomenon. Three groups of subjects (high, medium, 
and low aptitude for trance) were tested under either hyp­
notic induction instructions or standard waking instructions 
to imagine effects as they were suggested. T he.prediction 
was made that incongruity would characterize the performance 
of hypnotic subjects distinctively, especially those who 
had a marked degree of aptitude for hypnotic response. He 
further hypothesized that, if a durable trait is at issue, 
then paradoxical behavior should generalize across several 
tasks.
A range of tests that illustrated a tolerance of in­
congruity (see Peters, 1973) was adopted. Independent sets 
of 12 subjects were allocated to each of the three aptitude 
groupings and the two instruction conditions (n=72). The 
results once again challenged the validity of the double 
hallucination task as. a discriminative index. Ability was 
clearly relevant to the phenomenon as predicted, but waking 
imagination subjects displayed instances of tolerance of 
incongruity. As before, the transparency response proved 
to be the. more discriminative index; only hypnotic subjects
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(40%) illustrated this response when there were no obvious 
attempts to cue its appropriateness in the test situation.
An analysis of the data across all tasks revealed that 
the greatest incidence of response was associated with a 
high degree of aptitude for trance, there being no distinc­
tion apparent in the patterning of data for hypnotized and 
unhypnotized subjects. However, it was also found that the 
demonstration of trance logic varied with the tasks pre­
sented. On three tests, no subject in any condition gave 
a trance logic response.
' Two interpretations of these results seem reasonable. 
First, it is possible that the tasks that have been presented 
in the literature as measuring the process in question and 
tested by Sheehan (1977) do not, in fact, measure the same 
process as those who constructed them.intended. It is pos­
sible that the phenomenon requires more specific definition. 
In describing trance logic, Orne (1959) stated that "percep­
tions are fused in a manner that ignores everyday logic." 
However, as Hilgard (1965) aptly pointed out, this does not 
mean that all critical or logical abilities are suspended.
In short, the elements of trance logic have not been de­
lineated and as a consequence the phenomenon itself lacks a 
clear definition.
Second, it is not surprising that Sheehan (1977) found 
the same patterning of response for the subjects in the 
hypnotic condition and those given waking imagination
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instructions. In a series of experiments conducted by Jose­
phine Hilgard (Hilgard,. J., 1974), it was found that the 
ability to actively involve ones self in imaginal situations 
was the best single predictor of hypnotic susceptibility. It 
is therefore possible that the waking imagination instructions 
given by Sheehan (1977) in effect served as a hypnotic induc­
tion for this group of "nonhypnotized" subjects.
These studies provide important leads in the exploration 
of the phenomenon of trance logic, as a defining character­
istic of hypnosis. However, two methodological issues appear 
to contribute to the inconsistent results reported by the 
various researchers. It appears generally that the complex 
experimenter-subject interaction generates cues that blur 
the results in all cases. Second, the tasks which have been 
selected to test for tolerance of logical inconsistencies 
have required subjective scoring procedures. The present 
study will utilize a test of trance logic which permits 
simple and objective scoring and a procedure that attempts 
to eliminate the experimenter-subject interaction subsequent 
to induction, thereby minimizing scoring bias and placing 
the focus of the study on the measurable changes in behavior 
following a hypnotic induction instead of the interaction.
Orne (Note .2) developed a test of trance logic which, 
if modified, has the potential of satisfying these criteria.
It presents the subject with a set of formally and obviously
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illogical instructions and requires only that the subject 
respond "yes", "no", or give no response.
After administering an hypnotic induction Orne.(Note 2) 
proceeded as follows. He had the subject rest his arm out on 
the table in front of him, then Orne described a circle on 
the inside of the subject's forearm with his finger and 
Suggested that the subject had no feeling inside the circle.
(It is assumed by this writer that the subject's eyes were 
closed, but Orne did not specifically instruct him to do so.)
He then continued, "You have no feeling inside of this area.
Do you understand?" S: "Yes." Orne: "Now, when I touch
you outside of this area, like here, you can feel it. Right?" 
S: "Yes." Orne: "When I touch you inside, you cannot feel
it, like here." S: "No," Orne: "That's right. Now, every
time I touch you, when I touch you in a place where you can 
feel it, you say yes. If I touch you in a place where you can­
not feel it, if you have no feeling, you tell me no. Do you 
understand?" Thus, "no" responses provide evidence of trance 
logic thinking; they indicate the ability to mix perceptions 
derived from reality (touch) with those stemming from the 
Imagination (anesthesia).
Several problems are evident in this quoted administra­
tion. In addition to the interrelatiohal and eye-c.losure 
factors, the series of instructions as presented by Orne 
leave the'interpretation of the. subject's responses open to 
question. He confuses "feeling", a subjective experience,
39
with the sensation of touch; the subject is not told to re­
spond "no" when touched, but if he felt the touch. In addi­
tion, Orne did not adequately test for lack of feeling —  
he simply told the subject not to.have feeling within the cir­
cle and asked if the. subject understood the command. Thus, 
confusion in the instructions themselves blur the interpre­
tation of subject responses.
The modification of the touch test of trance logic to 
be used in this study eliminates these problems; a second 
experimenter who is blind to the predictions of the study 
will conduct the experimental test, the subjects will be 
tested for anesthesia, and will be instructed to respond if 
touched, not if the touch is felt.
In addition to these methodological issues, the prob­
lem of developing a test which isolates a distinguishing 
characteristic of. hypnosis is inevitably interwoven in the­
oretical constructions. Trance logic assumes a state con­
ceptualization of hypnosis which predicts a generalized 
diminuation of critical ability with increasing hypnotic 
involvement. Hypnosis is viewed as effecting variations in 
behavior along a single psychological axis, i.e., logical 
functioning. On the other hand, the concept of parallel in­
formation processing as incorporated in Hilgard's or Watkins' 
theoretical positions suggests the possibility of multiple 
manifestations of hypnotic involvement through activation of
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co-existent subsystems which may demonstrate various, combina­
tions Of logical and illogical functioning.
CHAPTER III
HYPOTHESES
Hypothesis i: Simulators will respond to a test of
trance logic following a formal logical 
pattern; that is, they will respond 
"yes" when touched outside the area 
of feigned anesthesia, and give no 
response when touched inside this area.
It is reasoned that when touched within the area of 
feigned anesthesia, simulators will be compelled by the 
logic of the situation to not respond verbally; the in­
structions given by E-2 were to say "no" if touched in 
the anesthetized area -- but, if the area if supposed to 
be anesthetized, then one couldn't feel the touch, could 
one? Hence, in furthering their ruse as hypnotized sub­
jects, it is predicted that simulators will feign anesthe­
sia, ignore the.touch, and not respond. Of course, when 
touched outside the circle, it is predicted that simulators 
will respond "yes" as instructed.
Hypothesis 2: Hypnotized subjects will demonstrate
trance logic by responding "no" when 
touched within the area of suggested 
anesthesia, and "yes" when touched 
outside this area. Further, the con­
sistency of this response pattern will 
increase with increasing aptitude for 
trance.
It is reasoned that if trance logic is indeed a valid 
phenomenon, hypnotized subjects, while experiencing the
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suggested anesthesia within the circles, will nonetheless at 
some level be aware of the touch (Hilgard's [1977] hidden 
observer is one possible explanation), and having been in­
structed to respond "no" if touched within the area will so 
respond. They will be unconcerned with the.illogical nature 
of the situation and respond to the inconsistent requests 
(anesthesia and saying "no" when touched in the anesthetized 
area) simultaneously. Please note a critical distinction; 
subjects will not be instructed to respond "no" if they feel 
a touch within the circle of suggested anesthesia, but to do 
so if they simply are touched. Of course,; when touched out­
side the circle, it is predicted that hypnotized subjects 
will respond as simulators and say "yes".
Further, it is reasoned that aptitude for trance- will 
effect the consistency of the trance logic response. Sub­
jects with moderate ability should show some degree of les­
sening of critical ability but highly hypnotizable subjects 
should demonstrate a reduction in normal critical functioning 
more consistently.
Hypothesis 3: Hypnotized subjects will demonstrate in­
creased suggestibility in trials when no 
stimulus, is applied by responding "no" 
with significantly greater frequency 
than simulators. Further, the consis­
tency of this response pattern will in­
crease with increasing aptitude for 
trance.
It is reasoned that if hypnotized subjects intermingle 
perceptions derived from reality with those that are imagined,
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then they will evidence a lessening of discriminative ability. 
That is, they will be more responsive to the expectation of 
touch and the demand to respond and, therefore, far more 
likely than simulators to inappropriately interpret the ab­
sence of touch as evidence that touch has been applied in the 
anesthetized area. Furthermore, as aptitude for trance in­
creases ,,evidence of such interference with discriminative 
ability should also increase.
CHAPTER IV
METHODS
The design was briefly as follows. Subjects were 
assigned by appropriate screening measures (Stanford Hyp­
notic Susceptibility Scale, Form C and Stanford Profile 
Scale of Hypnotic Susceptibility, Form I) to one of three 
groups. These included (I) Very Susceptible, (II) Moder­
ately Susceptible, and (III) Simulator. The underlying 
rationale was that those simulating hypnosis would not dem­
onstrate evidence of truly hypnotic phenomena (try as they 
might), while those actually hypnotized would demonstrate 
increasingly consistent manifestations of hypnosis. In 
other words, simulators would not demonstrate trance logic, 
but hypnotized subjects would in proportion to their hyp­
notic capabilities.
Subjects
Subjects for the initial screening were recruited from 
the student population at the University of Montana. Some 
students were enrolled in courses during the second half of 
the 1980 summer session. Others were employed in full-time 
summer jobs. Thirty experimental subjects were selected 
from these students depending on their responses to tests 




The individual screening and experimental testing took 
place in a room furnished with a table and chairs at the 
Clinical Psychology Center, University of Montana campus.
A Panasonic camera (Model WV-350P) and a Sony videocassette 
(Model VO-2600) were used to record the experimental sessions. 
Two Hunter interval timers (Model No. 100C, Series D) and a 
doorbell buzzer were used to regulate the trial intervals.
A 3 x 4 foot plywood shield with two 2 1/4" x 5" holes cut 
out of the bottom edge was situated on a table and served to 
visually separate subjects from the experimenter administering 
the trance logic test, i.e., E-2. A navy blue felt-tip pen 
was used to draw a circle, about 1 1/2" in diameter, on each 
subject's dominant hand at the base of the thumb. This area 
was chosen because it is free of hair, convenient, and it 
permitted sufficient room to apply stimulation outside the 
circle in a maximally similar area, i.e., on the other side 
of the palm. A Von Frey hair, calibrated to bend with the 
application of 4.56 grams of pressure, was used to stimulate 
the palm to test for a trance logic response. This instru­
ment was selected because it was light enough'to minimize 
the possibility of deforming the skin through touch while 




Initially all subjects were instructed to read two 
letters, one written by Dr. John.G. Watkins stating that 
hypnosis has not been found to be harmful to subjects in 
research (see Appendix A) and one written by the experi­
menter explaining the safeguards to be used to insure the 
subjects' comfort and security during the experiment (see 
Appendix B). They were then given a letter of consent (see 
Appendix C) to sign.
Subject Selection
The Stanford Hypnotic Susceptibility Scale, Form C 
(SHSS-C) and the Stanford Profile Scale of Hypnotic Suscept­
ibility, Form I (SPS-I) were administered during the indivi­
dual screening sessions. Only one induction procedure was 
used during screening —  the hand levitation technique des­
cribed in the SPS-I manual. Subjects who scored 7 or above 
on the SHSS-C and achieved a score of 20 or above on the 
SPS-I comprised the Very Susceptible group. Those who ob­
tained a SHSS-C score =7 and a SPS-I score less than 20 com­
prised the Moderately Susceptible group. The Simulator group 
consisted of those subjects who scored no higher than 3 on 
the SHSS-C.
In addition, after the SPS-I induction hypnotizable 
subjects were instructed to go to a comfortably deep level of 
hypnosis Which was at least as deep as they had attained before.
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When the subjects indicated they were at such a level by raising 
a finger, E-l stated, "I will refer to this level as a level 
of ten. Whenever I say, 'Go to a level of ten,' this is the 
level to which I will be referring. Stay at this level until 
you are instructed to do otherwise. Do you understand?" This 
instruction was included to maximize the probability that hyp- 
notizable subjects responded to the susceptibility items and 
the. experimental task with the same degree of hypnotic involve­
ment.
Experimental Procedure 
Part I : Preparation
1. To subjects in the two susceptible groups E-l explained 
that she (E-l) would administer an induction procedure, then 
call (E-2) into the room who would give the subject a simple 
and harmless test, i.e., a test of trance logic, and then ask 
the subject one question. During the test administration, it 
was explained, E-l would wait outside the room; when the test 
was completed E-l would return and E-2 would leave. E-l would 
then bring the subject out of hypnosis and de-brief.
2. For these two groups E-l then administered the induction 
procedure described in the SPS-I and used during screening 
(hand levitation) after which she instructed each subject to 
go back down to a level of ten. When a subject indicated 
being at such a level she then extended the subject's dominant 
hand through one of the cut-out holes in the plywood barrier
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set in front of the subject so the hand and arm rested com­
fortably palm up on the table. E-l then went to the other 
side of the barrier, explained that she was. drawing a circle 
on the palm of the hand and suggested that within the circle, 
the palm would be completely anesthetized and devoid of 
sensation. To ensure the subject's awareness of the desig­
nated area, E-l continued outlining the circle's perimeter 
with a pencil tip until the subject indicated the circum­
scribed area was devoid of sensation. She tested for anes­
thesia by simply asking, "Is the palm now completely anesthe­
tized and devoid of sensation within the circle? If so, in­
dicate this by wiggling a finger." The experimenter then 
instructed the subject to remain at a level of ten until told 
otherwise and suggested that the anesthesia would remain un­
til she gave the signal of resting her hand on the subject's 
shoulder at which time normal sensation would return to the 
hand.
3. Simulators were given the following instructions: "I'm
doing a study of hypnosis in which I'd like you to take. part.
I would like you not to go into a hypnotic trance; however,
E-2, who will be working with you, will not know whether.you 
are a. real' or fake subject. When I call her in here, she will 
go through, a test with you. Throughout the time E-2 is in the 
room I would like you to act as if you were in a.trance.
Your job is to fake the whole thing and try to fool E-2.
The test she will administer is harmless and will cause you
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no discomfort. She knows that I may have some people trying 
to fake their way through the experiment but has no idea who 
they are. I would like you, as a special favor, to try to do 
the best possible job of fooling her, to really convince'her 
that you are in a trance. This is quite difficult but a very 
important part of the experiment. I am trying to find out if 
people are capable of doing this successfully. If E-2 detects 
that you are faking, she will say so and call me back into the 
room. So, as long as E-2 does not call me back in, you will 
know you are doing a good job. After the test, but while you 
are still supposedly in a trance, she will ask you a question. 
Again, I don't want you to let on that you've been faking, and 
I would like you to answer the question as though you were in 
hypnosis. Please keep on playing this part until I return to 
the room and give you a signal. The signal will be that I 
flick the lights. Now I'm going to put your dominant hand 
through a hole in this plywood barrier and draw a circle on 
the palm with a felt-tip pen. You are to act as though you 
are anesthetized and completely devoid of sensation within the 
circle. I'm sure you'll be able to do a good, job of it. Do 
you have any questions?" If the subject asked how to act, 
the experimenter said she could not tell him (her) that, re­
emphasizing that it was up to the subject to decide how to go 
about fooling E-2.
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Part II: Test Administration
E-2 was blind both to subject condition (Very High, 
Moderately High, or Simulator) and to the experimental hy­
potheses. Thus, it was not likely that E-2 differentially 
influenced the task administration in subtle ways. Further, 
when E-2. entered the room she was unable to see the subject 
because the view was blocked by the barrier.
1. E-2 proceeded as follows:
a. "I am going to touch the hand with a fine stimulus 
tool. it is perceptible, but not strongly. It is calibrated 
at the threshold of perception, so sometimes you may feel it 
and sometimes you may not.1
b. Ascertained the subject was anesthetized inside the 
circle drawn on the palm by asking, "Is the palm inside the 
circle completely anesthetized and devoid of sensation? If 
so wiggle a finger to indicate that it is."
c. Continued with the following instructions: "I am 
going to turn on a machine which will emit a buzzing sound on 
a regular basis. After each buzz I will touch you once. I 
will let you know when I am beginning the first time. If I 
touch you inside,the circle say, 'no'; if I touch you outside 
the circle say, 'yes'." She then repeated the latter sentence.
d. Although the buzzer signaled 30 trials at a rate of 
one every four seconds, E-2 actually touched the subject's 
palm only 20 times with the Von Frey hair. The order in 
which the stimulus was presented, i.e., either inside the
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circle, outside the circle, or not at all, was randomized but 
all subjects were tested ten times under each condition.
e. Responses were recorded (either yes, no, or no 
response) for each four-second interval on a specially de­
vised answer sheet by E-2 (see Appendix D).
f. E-2 then thanked the subject and said, "Now I have
one more thing to ask of you. Please describe your exper­
ience since you came in here and were hypnotized for this 
experiment."
g. When the subject was finished describing his ex­
perience, E-2 said, "Thank you again. I will now call E-l
back into the room and I Will leave."
2. If the subject was a simulator, upon returning E-l gave 
the prearranged signal, thanked and de-briefed the subject.
If the subject was hypnotized, E-l gave the release signal 
and said, "Now I will bring you out of hypnosis by counting 
up from one to five. When I reach five you will feel wide 
awake, fresh and alert, and normal sensation will have com­
pletely returned to your hand. I also want you to know that 
I really appreciate your cooperation. You did very well and 
can be pleased about your contribution. Coming up now at the 
count of five, feeling fresh, wide awake and alert, coming up, 
one, two, three, four, five."
3. E-l reassured subjects the ink would wash off easily and 
began an informal post-experimental inquiry by asking subjects 
to describe their perceptions during the experimental test.
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De-briefing
E-l said, "Now I will explain to you-why I asked you to 
be in this study, and what I'm trying to do. Most people have 
heard about hypnosis and the kinds of behaviors people some­
times engage in when they are hypnotized. It is generally 
agreed by laymen and professionals alike that hypnosis can be 
a powerful tool. In the wrong hands it can be used to the 
disadvantage of some hypnotized people. However, I want to 
reassure you that therapists and researchers are bound by 
ethical principles; their aim is to use hypnosis to help 
people, not to harm them. Now something very interesting 
is that even though the effects of hypnotic suggestion are 
well known, no one really knows what it is. It seems that 
hypnotized people may process information differently than 
nonhypnotized people. Let me back up a step and explain that 
not everyone is able to become hypnotized. How come? Well, 
nobody knows. We do know it has nothing to do with intelli­
gence or what we know about personality. So I'm looking at 
the way people who can and cannot become hypnotized solve the 
kind of task you were given. If there are differences, we 
might be a step closer to understanding what hypnosis is —  
how it's distinctively different from not being hypnotized; 
if there are no differences, then we'll have to take another 
look and try something else. Do you have any questions?"
CHAPTER V
RESULTS
A split plot factorial analysis of variance with one 
between group factor at three levels (Simulators, Moderately 
Susceptible, Highly Susceptible) and two within group factors 
each at three levels (Place of Stimulation: In, Out, No Stim­
ulation; Response Category: Yes, No, No Response) was used
to analyze the data. A significant three way interaction 
(groups x place of stimulation x response) was found (F =
2.73, df = 108, p <•009). A representation of this interaction 
is presented in Figures 3, 4, and 5.
As indicated in the figures, when touched outside the 
circle all groups were most likely to respond "yes" and very 
unlikely to say "ho" or to give no response at all (Figure 3). 
For trials in which subjects were not stimulated (Figure 4), 
all groups were very unlikely to respond "yes" and most likely- 
to say nothing. However, when subjects were stimulated inside 
the circle (Figure 5), responses varied with group assignment. 
The Simulator and Moderately Susceptible groups demonstrated 
nearly opposite patterns of response in this condition^ 
Simulators tended to give no response when touched inside 
while Moderately Susceptible subjects responded "yes" with 
















Figure 3. Relationship Between Simulating and
Susceptible Groups when Place of
Stimulation was Outside the Circle
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Figure 4. Relationship Between Simulating and
Susceptible. Groups, when No Stimula-
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Figure 5. Relationship Between Simulating and
Susceptible Groups when Place of


















response to the stimulation. Both the faking and medium 
susceptible groups said "no", as directed, with nearly the 
same frequency (Simulators, 3/10; Moderately Susceptible, 
3.3/10). Very Susceptible subjects responded less predic­
tably when touched inside the circle; as a group they were 
nearly as likely to say either "yes", "no", or give no re­
sponse in this condition.
A Newman-Keuls pairwise multiple comparison test was 
performed on.the means of the three-factor interaction and 
revealed no significant differences in the pattern of re­
sponding between groups when touched outside the circle 
(Figure1 3) or when not touched at all (Figure 4). However, 
response patterns did significantly differentiate two of the 
groups when the stimulation was applied inside the circle.
In this condition both the "yes" and "no response" categories 
differentiated the simulators from the moderately susceptible 
subjects ("yes": Dg = 5.2, p<r.05; "no response": Dg = 5.5,
p<.05). HOwever, no statistically significant differences 
were found between the Very Susceptible group and either of 
other two groups in these response categories. Furthermore, 
the three subject groups responded "no" with about the same 
average frequency to stimulation inside the circle.
Only response to stimulation within the circle revealed 
any group differences. Table 1 demonstrates how individual 
subjects within the three groups responded to inside stimu­
lation .
TABLE 1
INDIVIDUAL RESPONSES TO STIMULATION APPLIED INSIDE THE CIRCLE
Simulator Moderately Susceptible Very Susceptible
Subj Yes No No Resp Subi Yes No No Resp Subj Yes No No Resp
1 0 0 10 11 • 0 10 0 21 0 1 9
2 0 . 0 10 ■ 12 1 6 3 22 2 6 2
3 0 0 10 13. 10 0 0 23 0 0 10
4 . 0 ‘ 0 10 14 10 o: 0 24 4 4 2
.5 . 0 0 10 15 9 1 0 25 2 8 0
6 0 10 0 16 10 0 0 26 0 10 0
7 0 10 0 17 5 0 5 27 7 0 3
8 0 0 10 18 9 0 1 28 4 3 3
9' 2 0 8 19 0 10 0 29 10 0 0
10 0 10 0 20 0 6 4 30 . 0 10 0





Contrary to Orne's prediction, the present findings do 
not support the notion that the "no" response category alone 
can be used as a discriminative index to differentiate truly 
hypnotized subjects from those faking hypnosis. It was pre­
dicted that when touched inside the circle, hypnotized sub­
jects would distinguish themselves from simulators by re­
sponding "no" most frequently and rarely say "yes".or not 
respond. In fact, simulators were nearly as likely to say 
"no" as either hypnotized group, and did not evidence a 
significantly different pattern of responding from very sus­
ceptible subjects in any response category ("yes", "no", 
or "no response"). This test did distinguish the moderately 
susceptible group from the.simulators on the basis of "no 
response" and "yes" response categories (see Figure 5). Thus, 
the viability of the test as a discriminating instrument re­
mains, although on the basis of unexpected results.
These data indicate that 50% of the hypnotized subjects 
could have been identified on the basis of the frequency of 
."yes" responses alone when stimulation was applied inside the 
circle. Of twenty hypnotizable subjects, ten (6 Moderately 
Susceptible and 4 Very Susceptible) responded "yes" 40% - 100%
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of the time to touch in this condition (see Table 1). Two 
additional very susceptible subjects gave "yes" responses in 
20% of these trials, .but so did one simulator. Oite other 
moderately susceptible subject also said "yes" and then only 
once .in response to touch in the circle.
It is not likely that these results are a manifestation 
of greater confusion on the part of susceptible subjects in 
understanding the instructions. When the place of stimula­
tion was outside the circle, subjects across all groups regu­
larly responded "yes" as directed (see Figure 3). Thus, the 
induction of hypnosis apparently effected neither the ability 
of subjects to understand the instructions nor their ability 
to perceive the stimulus.
Furthermore, if patterns of. response, extended to in­
clude "no" and "no response" categories, are considered, the 
three susceptible subjects who only infrequently responded 
"yes" would be properly identified as well. That is, the one. 
simulator who gave two "yes" responses out of a possible ten, 
did not respond at all to the remaining eight touches, whereas 
the three hypnotizable subjects said "no" in a majority of 
the other trials in this condition (see Table 1). Thus, 
using objective criteria alone, up to 65% of the hypnotized 
subjects in this study could have been accurately identified. 
-This percentage is far greater than that reported by other 
researchers in the field when relying strictly on objective 
data.
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Subjective self-reports given by subjects in a post-
?
experimental inquiry also add substantially to the test's 
discriminative ability. This finding is in line with ob­
servations reported by other researchers in the field who 
have found, for example, that transparency reports given 
after the double-hallucination test are unique to hypno­
tized people. A comparison of simulators with hypnotized 
subjects by response category to stimulation applied inside 
the circle yielded systematic differences.
The seven simulators who remained silent (see Table lj 
all or most of the time in response to touch in this condi­
tion reasoned, as predicted, that if truly anesthetized, then 
one could not feel the touch. Accordingly, they did. not re­
spond. On the other hand, hypnotizable subjects who had not 
responded to some or all of the within circle touches were 
not able to offer any explanation for their behavior; they 
indicated surprise when learning they had been touched ten 
times in the area because they just did not think the touch 
had been applied so frequently, if at all. It is possible 
that these susceptibles, like the simulators, placed primary 
emphasis on the anesthe.sia' instruction given by the hypnotist, 
lessening the importance of the demand to respond given by 
the anonymous co-experimenter. if so, this manner of re­
sponding may be reflective of the impact of the hypnotist/ 
subject relationship on the interpretation of a contradictory 
set of instructions. On the other hand, it may also be that
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these susceptible subjects so completely accepted the 
anesthesia suggestion that they did not register the oc­
currence of touch in a way that was accessible to aware­
ness .
Of the three simulating subjects who said "no"- to the 
application of stimulation inside the circle, two reported 
that they acted on the assumption that hypnotized people 
followed instructions, and therefore, simply did what the 
co-experimenter told them to do. The third simulator who 
gave consistent "no" responses offered a uniquely reasoned 
rationale for his behavior. "Assuming that the area within 
the circle was numb, there would be an absence of sensation 
if the tester touched me there or if she didn't touch my 
hand at all. If she touched me outside the circle I re­
sponded '.yes', if inside or not at all, 'no'. That is, 
sensation or that which I was instructed to recognize as 
sensation was.'yes', and anything else, 'no'." This sub­
ject was able to identify the key element in both instruc­
tions —  the presence or absence of sensation —  and use 
the abstraction to guide his behavior. In contrast, hypno- 
tizable subjects who had given any number of "no" responses 
in this condition recalled that perception of touch but 
noted that it seemed different from the Stimulation applied 
outside the circle. Such reports from susceptibles are con­
sistent with the trance logic concept that hypnotized people 
have the ability to folerate logical inconsistencies without
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manifesting disturbance. The response of "no" in addition 
to the quality of uncriticalness in their self-reports in­
dicate that the majority of hypnotized subjects (5 Moderately 
Susceptible and 7 Very Susceptible) demonstrated this phenomenon 
at least some of the time.
It should be cautioned, however, that the qualitative 
differences in self-reports which appear to distinguish reals 
from simulators (i.e., logical reasoning versus uncriticalness) 
can be explained without attributing this difference either 
to hypnosis, the presence of hypnosis, or to being hypnotized. 
These, differences may well be a function of simulation as an 
independent treatment.
The ability to demonstrate hypnotic phenomena is an 
ability .which some people appear to have to a greater or les­
ser extent while others do not. This ability may be seen as 
comparable to any number of other abilities which differentiate 
people. For example, some people are born with perfect pitch 
and some cannot carry a tune. If one were to compare those 
people having a demonstrated ability to carry a tune to those 
without such an ability who are instructed to fake perfect 
pitch, the strategies used and reported by these two groups 
of people to sing, a song are obviously going to differ greatly. 
The people with perfect pitch are likely to report the exper­
ience without resorting to a reasoning process to explain 
how it is that one particular sound followed another. On 
the other hand, those attempting to fake perfect pitch are
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likely to describe a logical strategy which they used to 
appear to sing on tune, a task which is alien to their ex­
perience. Consequently, even though the self-reports can 
serve to distinguish between the groups the finding is strict­
ly an empirical one, not explanatory.
Furthermore, the concept of trance logic neither ac­
counts for the distinguishing characteristic of the "yes" 
response category nor for the subjective self-reports' given 
by subjects who responded in such a manner when touched in­
side the circle. These susceptible subjects all reported 
experiencing the touch in the proximal perimeter of the circle 
and recalled feeling briefly confused at the perception; they 
were surprised to perceive the touch on the boundary and were 
not sure, how to respond. The "yes" responses were prompted 
by the reasoning that since the touch was clearly felt that it 
must have been presented just outside the anesthetized area.
These reports might be interpreted as quite in.line 
with the repeated experience that hypnotized subjects often 
carry.out an irrational suggestion and then attempt to pro­
vide a reasonable explanation to account for their behavior. 
However, it is odd that such rationalizations would be evi­
denced only to account for "yes" responses but not when sub­
jects said "no" or gave no response in the same condition.
It may be that their independently reported memories of con­
fusion and reasoning reflect active psychological processing 
of perplexing information. The nonverbal reaction of some
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subjects observed by McDonald and Smith (1975) "who seemed 
to wait for a response from the therapist" during the double- 
hallucination test may be manifestations of the same process. 
A substantial methodological difference which exists between 
the double-hallucination test conducted by McDonald and 
Smith and this study may have served to intensify the ex­
perience of confusion consistently reported by subjects and 
led to its reporting. In this experiment the hypnotist was 
outside the room during the test administration. Accordingly, 
the subjects had no opportunity to defer the responsibility 
of making a decision to the hypnotist or to obtain cues from 
her; they had to confront the inconsistency between experi­
ence and expectation on their own.
These subjects appeared to have handled the incongruity 
in the situation through displacement. This, strategy satis­
fied thfe conflicting demands to perceive no touch inside the 
circle but to report when touched; although the accuracy of 
the location was sacrificed, the experience of touch given 
in the anesthetized area could be reported.
Two additional sources of evidence indicate that demand 
characteristics did not systematically bias subject responses. 
The first line of evidence is suggested in the relationship 
between the simulating and two hypnotized groups when no
stimulus was administered (see Figure 4). The instructions
/
given by the co-experimenter stated that each trial would 
begin with a buzzer sound and that after each buzz she would
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touch them once. Accordingly, it might be expected that 
susceptible subjects in this condition would be. more likely 
to act upon this expectation and produce a response than 
would the simulating subjects. In fact, this tended to be 
the case. However, the differences between the three groups, 
although in the expected direction, were slight and not sta­
tistically significant. It might be concluded from this that 
hypnotized subjects are nearly as able to discriminate a lack 
of stimulus and respond appropriately as are simulators; ap­
parently hypnotized people do retain a considerable degree of 
critical functioning. This does not support the frequently 
stated concept that demand characteristics necessarily exert 
an undue effect on hypnotized subjects.
Second, the prediction was made that the differences 
between the very susceptibles and the simulators would be 
greater than between the moderately susceptibles and the sim­
ulators. Such was not the case. In fact, very susceptible 
subjects differed on the average substantially less from the 
simulators than did the moderately susceptibles, resulting 
in group differences that were not statistically significant. 
One factor which substantially influenced this finding was 
that of response -variability. The greater the susceptibility, 
the more the groups tended to demonstrate an even distribu­
tion of response across categories. Furthermore, within 
subjects this lack of consistency was evidenced; only 50% of 
the moderately susceptible and 40% of the very susceptible
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subjects were as consistent as 90% of the simulators. Ac­
cordingly, it might be interpreted that hypnosis does not 
serve to determine a particular response, but rather broadens 
the range of possible responses available to subjects.
In conclusion, these data provide only limited sup­
port for the trance logic concept which assumes that the 
induction of hypnosis brings about a change in the state of 
consciousness, resulting in increased suggestibility and a 
lack of logical, critical functioning. Most subjects do- 
appear to evidence a tolerance of logical inconsistencies at 
least some of the time. However, this phenomenon did not 
present itself in this test with sufficient frequency to 
rely on its occurrence alone as a distinguishing index. 
Furthermore, a significantly greater suggestibility to demand 
on the part of the susceptible subjects as compared to the sim­
ulators was not evidenced. This may have been a function of 
the methods used in this study. The hypnotist was not present 
during the test administration and, hence, the subjects 
could not rely on her to bolster a sense of trust or to give 
informational cues. One might suspect that under these con­
ditions subjects may well have lessened their degree of hyp­
notic involvement. However, it is unreasonable to conclude 
that subjects were not hypnotized during the test administration 
for they produced responses which were distinctively contra- 
expectational.
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A dissociative concept of hypnosis such as proposed by 
Hilgard (1977) or by Watkins (1978b) seems to have the pos­
sibility of accounting for these unexpected findings best.
This concept postulates that a hypnotic induction permits 
various segments of functioning to operate contemporaneously 
but often independently of normal psychological processes.
For example, the "yes" responses given by some subjects to 
stimulation applied inside the circle in conjuction with 
these subjects' self-reports suggests an active displacement, 
a process which implies more than one part or more than one 
level of psychological functioning occurring within the hyp­
notized individual. Also, the confusion consistently re- 
i ported by these subjects suggests that they were not aware of 
- or in control of the process Which led to the displacement. 
Further research into this phenomenon, perhaps using the 
hidden observer technique proposed by Hilgard (1977), might 
add to the understanding of the. psychological processes under­
lying this kind of response.
The greater variability of response evidenced by sus- 
ceptibles suggests a more flexible access to various problem 
solving strategies. To satisfy both demands posed.in the 
conflicting instructions hypnotized people apparently either 
change the quality of their perceptions of touch (indicated 
by "no" responders) or change the location of the touch (as 
with "yes" responders) and some sample both strategies.
Whether such strategies are fundamentally illogical or
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logical, involve*a free mixing of perceptions or a reasonably 
ordered sequencing of them, cannot be determined conclusively 
from these data. It may be that hypnosis involves a disso­
ciation of various segments of psychological processes so 
that both logical and trance-logical thinking can occur 




LETTER TO SUBJECTS EXPLAINING THAT HYPNOSIS IS
NOT HARMFUL TO EXPERIMENTAL SUBJECTS
July 7, 1980
As a member of Karen Eiblmayr's thesis committee, Past 
President of the International Society for Clinical and Ex­
perimental Hypnosis, Associate Editor of the International 
Journal of Clinical and Experimental Hypnosis, and author 
of several books in the field, I would like to give the 
following reassurance.
There is no evidence, experimental or clinical, that 
the phenomena of hypnosis is harmful to subjects. Research 
studies are presently being conducted on hypnosis in many of 
the major universities of the country. No coercion will be 
made during this study on the subjects, and the likelihood 
of any harm occurring to any of the volunteering subjects is 
no greater than that posed in any of the laboratory studies 
in which psychology students are involved regularly, such 
as studies of learning, perception, or motivation.
Subjects will be Selected from volunteers who are under 
no pressure to become involved in the study nor to continue 
in it should they wish to withdraw.
Each subject will be asked to sign the enclosed consent 






LETTER TO SUBJECTS EXPLAINING THE SAFEGUARDS 
TO BE USED DURING THE EXPERIMENT
Although the probability of any harm occurring to any 
volunteer in this study concerning hypnosis is no greater 
than that posed in any of the laboratory studies in which 
psychology students are involved regularly, I would like to 
inform you of the safeguards which will be employed to en­
sure your.comfort and security during the experiment.
At any one time hypnosis will be induced during this 
experiment by one of three people. Two of these people are 
advanced graduate students in Clinical Psychology who have 
been trained in the appropriate use of hypnosis and have 
worked under the supervision of John G. and Helen H. Watkins. 
You have just read Dr. Watkins' credentials. The third ex­
perimenter is Mrs. Watkins who is also an internationally 
recognized hypnotherapist, a member of the International 
Society for Clinical and Experimental Hypnosis and a published 
researcher in the field.
These three experienced investigators will assure that 
the hypnotic experience is enjoyable to you and free of 
disturbance; most people report hypnosis to be relaxing, 
interesting and pleasurable.
I also want to remind you that you are under no obli­
gation to become involved in this study nor to continue in 




CONSENT TO PARTICIPATE AS A SUBJECT IN A RESEARCH .
STUDY BEING CONDUCTED BY KAREN EIBLMAYR
I fully understand that this research study will in­
volve hypnosis in evaluating my responses in the experi­
mental situation. I further understand that hypnosis is 
not harmful and that there is no likelihood that I will 
suffer' any harmful effects from my participation in this 
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